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SILENCING THE CALL TO ARMS: A SHIFT 
AWAY FROM CYBER ATTACKS AS WARFARE 
Ryan Patterson∗ 
          Cyberspace has developed into an indispensable aspect of 
modern society, but not without risk. Cyber attacks have increased in 
frequency, with many states declaring cyber operations a priority in 
what has been called the newest domain of warfare. But what rules 
govern? The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to 
Cyber Warfare suggests existent laws of war are sufficient to govern 
cyber activities; however, the Tallinn Manual ignores fundamental 
problems and unique differences between cyber attacks and kinetic 
attacks. This Article argues that several crucial impediments frustrate 
placing cyber attacks within the current umbra of warfare, chiefly the 
problems of attribution, categorizing uses of force under the jus ad 
bellum, and compliance with the armed-conflict principles of 
distinction and proportionality and the law of neutrality. Consequently, 
identifying a victim-state’s recourse becomes risky and problematic. 
For the vast majority of cases, this Article proposes departing from the 
warfare paradigm and suggests states pursue alternative remedial 
approaches. By domestically prosecuting cybercrimes, seeking 
reparations for violations of non-intervention, and enhancing national 
cybersecurity, states can effectively mitigate cyber attacks without the 
risks and obstacles associated with treating cyber attacks as warfare. 
∗ J.D., May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. English, University of
California, Berkeley, May 2008. I sincerely thank Professor David Glazier for his guidance and 
expertise, and my Developments Editor, Rosemarie Unite, for her excellent editorial support. 
Most importantly, a special thank you to my wife, Debbie, for her constant love and 
encouragement.   
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that the United States is under attack. Not by aircraft, 
tanks, or submarines, but by something altogether different. In just 
hours, government websites are shut down. Access to banking, news, 
and social media websites is disrupted. Cable television and mobile 
communications experience blackouts in large swaths. E-commerce 
grinds to a standstill. To say that such an attack would impart chaos 
on American society would not be hyperbole, given the country’s 
staggering reliance on the Internet.1 Nor is this reliance specific to 
the United States; countries around the world have seen exponential 
growth in Internet usage.2 With such widespread Internet reliance, 
the development of malicious cyber tactics,3 network exploitation, 
and critical system vulnerabilities was inevitable. 
Over the past several years, many high-profile cyber attacks 
have caught the world’s attention. In 2007, Estonia was the victim of 
a three-week cyber attack that first shut down government websites, 
and then spread to websites of newspapers, television stations, 
schools, and banks, repeatedly rendering them inoperable for hours 
and days at a time.4 The effects were noteworthy, since at that time 
Estonia was considered the most wired country in Europe, with 
nationwide wi-fi and a near paperless “e-government” that conducted 
ninety percent of its bank and election services online.5 Similarly, the 
country of Georgia suffered attacks in 2008 that triggered 
1. As of June 30, 2012, about 245 million Americans use the Internet. Internet Usage,
Facebook Subscribers and Population Statistics for All the Americas World Region Countries 
June 30, 2012, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats2.htm (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2013). This figure represents a population penetration of seventy-eight and 
one-tenth percent. Id. 
2. Of the roughly seven billion people on the planet, 2.4 billion use the Internet. World
Internet Usage and Population Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstat
s.com/stats.htm (last visited, Oct. 23, 2013).
3. See David Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Rise Is Seen in Cyberattacks Targeting U.S.
Infrastructure, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/27/us/cyberattacks 
-are-up-national-security-chief-says.html (reporting that “[t]he top American military official
responsible for defending the United States against cyberattacks said . . . there had been a 17-fold
increase in computer attacks on American infrastructure between 2009 and 2011, initiated by
criminal gangs, hackers and other nations.”).
4. Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11
LEWIS AND CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1024–25 (2007); Steven Lee Myers, Cyberattack on Estonia 
Stirs Fear of ‘Virtual War’, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05 
/18/world/europe/18iht-estonia.4.5774234.html?_r=0. 
5. Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in
International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 193–94 (2009). 
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widespread Internet outages and forced many government websites 
to blazon Russian nationalistic propaganda.6 In 2010, the Stuxnet 
virus, collaboratively generated and executed by Israel and the 
United States, temporarily shut down one-fifth of the centrifuges 
used to purify uranium at Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility.7 And finally, 
in 2013, a group of pro-Syrian government hackers known as the 
Syrian Electronic Army defaced a United States Marines Corps 
recruitment website with a letter urging marines to “concentrate on 
the real reason every soldier joins their military, to defend their 
homeland,” in response to the United States’ involvement in the 
Syrian conflict.8 
Such high-profile attacks have led many nations around the 
world to realize the need for expanded cybersecurity and to develop 
the capability to conduct offensive cyber operations of their own, in 
what many believe has become the next frontier in modern warfare.9 
President Obama declared cyber threats to be one of the most serious 
threats to national security, public safety, and economic stability,10 
spurring the 2009 commission of the United States Cyber Command 
6. Marco Roscini, World Wide Warfare—Jus Ad Bellum and the Use of Cyber Force, 14
MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 85, 90 (2010); John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html. 
7. See generally David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave Of Cyberattacks Against
Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama 
-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-againstiran.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&&gwh
=355753CAC7448E51CB1B05A46ECE9BBC; Jonathan Fildes, Stuxnet Virus Targets and
Spread Revealed, BBC NEWS TECH. (Feb. 15, 2011, 1:51 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news
/technology-12465688 (describing the Stuxnet attack).
8. John Bacon, Pro-Syrian Group Hacks U.S. Marines Website, USA TODAY, Sept. 2,
2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/02/marines-hackers-syrian-electronic 
-army/2755265/. Along with the propaganda effort, the Syrian Electronic Army assailed the New
York Times and the Washington Post with a rash of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.
Id.
9. See NILS MELZER, CYBERWARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 2011, at 3 (2011),
available at http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cyberwarfare-and-international-law-382.pdf 
(stating “military reliance on computer systems and networks . . . open[ed] a ‘fifth’ domain of 
war—fighting next to the traditionally recognized domains of land, sea, air and outer space”); 
Roscini, supra note 6, at 97–98 (noting many nations now commission “uniformed hackers” in 
their military, including China, Israel, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States); 
Leslie Swanson, The Era of Cyber Warfare: Applying International Humanitarian Law to the 
2008 Russian-Georgian Cyber Conflict, 32 LOYOLA L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 305 
(2010) (“As modern society increasingly relies on global and domestic information structures, 
these structures tend to become targets during war and other hostilities.”). 
10. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 27 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
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(USCYBERCOM), whose stated goal is to safeguard the integrity of 
the U.S. military computer systems.11 
If cyber attacks continue to be characterized with military 
rhetoric as “cyberwarfare,” it raises the question of which legal rules 
govern these activities. The answer will dictate a victim state’s 
available remedies or responses under international law, and inform 
state and non-state actors how to lawfully conduct cyber activities. 
Ostensibly, a few choices exist: apply traditional law of war rules (as 
developed through existing treaties and customary international law 
(CIL)), develop new rules through an international treaty specific to 
“cyberwarfare” activities, or adopt alternative frameworks beyond 
the warfare paradigm.12 
Many Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) scholars propose that 
cyber attacks should be treated like advancements in conventional 
kinetic weaponry and may therefore qualify as uses of force under 
the law governing the use of armed force by states in international 
relations (jus ad bellum).13 This means cyber attacks that met the 
threshold definition of a use of force would be unlawful under the 
U.N. Charter, which prohibits members from using or threatening to 
use force in their international relations,14 and recognizes the 
inherent right of self-defense against force that qualifies as an armed 
attack.15 Scholars also contend that cyber attacks are subject to the 
law governing the means and methods of warfare (jus in bello, or 
LOAC),16 which requires that military hostilities follow such 
foundational principles as distinction,17 proportionality,18 and the law 
of neutrality during an armed conflict.19 
11. Tod Leaven & Christopher Dodge, The United States Cyber Command: International
Restrictions vs. Manifest Destiny, 12 N.C.L.J. & TECH. ON. 1, 1–2 (2010). 
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., MELZER, supra note 9; Catherine Lotrionte, Symposium: International Law
and the Internet: Adapting Legal Frameworks in Response to Online Warfare and Revolutions 
Fueled by Social Media: State Sovereignty and Self-Defense in Cyberspace: A Normative 
Framework for Balancing Legal Rights, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 825 (2012); Roscini, supra 
note 6; Swanson, supra note 9. 
14. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
15. Id. art. 51. See infra Part III for a full discussion on cyber attacks as potential uses of
force under the jus ad bellum. 
16. MELZER, supra note 9, at 4.
17. Requiring that attackers “at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives.” Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Additional Protocol I]. 
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At the invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence, a group of international experts has gone 
further and published the Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare,20 which is intended as a restatement 
and manual similar to the San Remo Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea and the Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare.21 The 
Tallinn Manual analyzes cyber operations using existent jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello rules, with mostly successful results.22 
However, such extrapolation is not without problems. Several crucial 
impediments present themselves, which frustrate placing cyber 
attacks within the umbra of warfare—the greatest being the problem 
of attribution.23 With the increasing participation of non-state actors 
in attacks against states around the world, the bounds of the LOAC 
have already become strained as experts debate whether, and how, 
the traditional LOAC rules apply to such non-state actors.24 The 
difficulty of determining identities in cyberspace, where civilian 
hacker groups can conduct cyber attacks utilizing personal 
computers, makes this inquiry all the more perplexing.25 Victim 
states may find themselves unsure which state should be held 
18. Requiring that inadvertent or incidental civilian casualties and damage (collateral
damage) not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. Id. art. 51. 
19. Obligating neutral states to prevent their territory from being used by belligerents in an
international armed conflict, and requiring belligerents to respect a neutral state’s territory as 
inviolable by refraining from prohibited conduct in the neutral territory. Hague Convention (V) 
Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, arts. 1, 
5, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. See infra Part IV for a full 
discussion on whether cyber attacks may comply with the jus in bello. 
20. Int’l Grp. of Experts, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013), available at http://issuu.com/nato_ccd_coe/ 
docs/tallinnmanual?e=5903855/1802381 [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL]. 
21. Id. at 1. See PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT 
HARVARD UNIV., MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE 
WARFARE (2009), available at http://ihlresearch.org/amw/HPCR%20Manual.pdf; SAN REMO 
MANUAL ON MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 
(Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995).  
22. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20.
23. Id. at 1.
24. See Collin S. Allan, Attribution Issues in Cyberspace, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L.
55 (2013); Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 855. The U.N. Security Council has implied the LOAC 
can in fact apply to non-state actors (authorizing the United States to use self-defense measures 
against al-Qaeda under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter); however, the contours of such application 
remain in debate. Lotrionte, supra note 13. 
25. Allan, supra note 24, at 55.
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responsible, assuming the cyber attack is traceable at all.26 For 
example, the route traveled by the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia was 
traced through Russia and several of its government institutions, but 
also traversed 177 other countries along the way.27 
While the Tallinn Manual has been successful in elucidating 
how many traditional LOAC rules and principles apply to cyber 
attacks, its failure to address some glaring incongruities necessitates 
either supplementary international development or a departure from 
the warfare model altogether. Current manifestations of cyber attacks 
rarely achieve militaristic ends, but rather take the form of espionage, 
crime, or political and economic coercion.28 This Article contends 
that because the nature of a cyber attack often precludes proper legal 
analysis under the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, the effort of the 
Tallinn Manual and other LOAC experts to summarily insert the 
growing phenomenon into the war paradigm is premature. Instead, 
this Article argues, alternative legal regimes should be used to 
respond to cyber threats until international rules specific to cyber 
attacks develop. Part II of this Article provides an overview of 
relevant definitions and the unique setting of cyberspace. 
Consequently, Part III evaluates how cyberspace’s principal 
architecture may render attribution of cyber attacks to states 
impractical. Part IV reviews the categorization of attacks as uses of 
force under the jus ad bellum, and how cyber attacks generally fall 
short of the definition. Part V examines the conduct of hostilities 
under the jus in bello, exploring how cyber attacks may comply with 
the principles of distinction, proportionality, and obligations under 
the law of neutrality. Finally, Part VI analyzes how alternate legal 
regimes, including domestic law enforcement and the international 
principle of non-interference, may prove more effective frameworks 
to govern malicious cyber activities. 
II. DEFINING “CYBERWARFARE” AND ITS UNIQUE NATURE
To properly discuss the legal ramifications of international cyber 
attacks against states, working definitions of pertinent terms are 
26. Id.
27. Id. While the legal countermeasures available to Estonia at the time remain unclear, the
complicated route the cyber attacks followed clearly illustrates the attribution quagmire. Michael 
Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 525, 530 (2012). 
28. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 4.
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warranted. The term “cyberspace” is used to describe the “space of 
virtual reality; the notional environment within which electronic 
communication (especially via the Internet) occurs.”29 Cyberspace 
encompasses email, the Internet, file transferring, as well as other 
programs that connect computer users.30 Terminology specific to 
cyber activities has been developed to assist in categorizing the 
breadth of possible operations.31 At the broadest level, any 
“reduction of information to electronic format” and its passage 
“between physical elements of cyber infrastructure” constitutes a 
“computer network operation” (CNO).32 In the context of malicious 
cyber activities, CNOs can then be subdivided into three 
categorizations: (1) computer network attack (CNA),33 (2) computer 
network exploitation (CNE),34 or (3) computer network defense 
(CND).35 CNEs are efforts “focused on intelligence collection and 
observation rather than on network disruption,”36 and are presumed 
lawful under international law, which does not prohibit espionage.37 
CNAs and CNDs, on the other hand, “aim at altering or destroying 
the information contained in the targeted computer or computer 
network with the purpose of incapacitating . . . and/or of causing 
damage extrinsic to the targeted computer/network.”38 This Article 
discusses only CNAs and CNDs that potentially rise to the level of a 
use of force under jus ad bellum or are employed in an armed 
29. Cyberspace, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry
/240849?redirectedFrom=cyberspace& (last visited Dec. 16, 2013). 
30. Gervais, supra note 27.
31. See generally MELZER, supra note 9, at 5 (summarizing categories of cyber operations).
32. Id.
33. Any cyber operation “aiming to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident
in computers and computer networks, or to the computers and networks themselves.” Id. (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
34. Any cyber operation “enabling . . . intelligence collection to gather data from target or
adversary automated information systems or networks.” Id. (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
35. Any cyber operation “taken to protect, monitor, analyse, detect, and respond to
unauthorized activity within . . . information systems and computer networks.” Id. (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
36. Roscini, supra note 6, at 92. Examples of CNEs include stealing sensitive information
such as IDs and passwords from computers through the use of “trap doors” (that allow external 
users to unknowingly access computer software) and “sniffers” (remote programs that intercept 
data transmitted over a network). Id. at 93. 
37. Id.
38. Id.
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conflict subject to the jus in bello.39 The most prevalent forms of 
CNAs and CNDs are hardware and software corruption through the 
use of viruses and worms,40 or distributed denial of service 
(DDoS).41 
The U.S. Army’s Cyber Operations and Cyber Terrorism 
Handbook defines a cyber attack as “[t]he premeditated use of 
disruptive activities, or the threat thereof, against computers and/or 
networks, with the intention to cause harm or to further social, 
ideological, religious, political or similar objectives . . . [o]r to 
intimidate any person in furtherance of such objectives.”42 However, 
that definition is very broad, exceeding the bounds of what the 
LOAC considers to be an attack.43 A narrower definition would 
proscribe “efforts to alter, disrupt, or destroy computer systems or 
networks or the information or programs on them.”44 Yet these 
common definitions fail to demonstrate the essential notion of what 
constitutes an attack—an act of violence.45 The Tallinn Manual, 
commensurate with LOAC definitions, defines a cyber attack as a 
“cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably 
expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction 
39. Included are CNAs and CNDs deployed either by military combatants targeting a state,
or non-state actors whose conduct is attributable to a state. The CNO designations are not 
exclusively military terms and may encompass otherwise private activities that do not implicate 
international law. Id. 
40. Id. Viruses and worms are self-replicating programs that “can be installed . . . through
chipping, hacking, or by simply e-mailing them.” Id. A virus “attaches itself to a legitimate 
program on the target computer” and alters its function, other programs’ functions, as well as the 
programs of computers connected to the host computer via a network. Id. A worm does not alter 
resident programs, but “captures the addresses of . . . target computer[s] and resends messages 
throughout the system so to cause a general slowdown and potentially a crash.” Id. 
41. A DDoS attack is accomplished when many computers simultaneously inundate a target
network with large volumes of requests, rendering the network incapacitated. Id. A common 
cyber attack tactic, several notorious DDoS attacks have been conducted in the past several years, 
such as the coordinated website takedowns of Bank of America, Citibank, Wells Fargo, and JP 
Morgan Chase in 2012. Ellen Nakashima & Danielle Douglas, More Companies Reporting 
Cybersecurity Incidents, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world 
/national-security/more-companies-reporting-cybersecurity-incidents/2013/03/01/f7f7cb68-8293 
-11e2-8074-b26a871b165a_story.html.
42. U.S. ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND, DCSINT HANDBOOK NO. 1.02,
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE THREATS AND TERRORISM, at VII-2 (2006). 
43. See infra Part III.
44. Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article
2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 422 (2011). 
45. An “attack” is an “act[] of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or
defence.” Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 49. 
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of objects.”46 In addition, the Tallinn Manual explains that “acts of 
violence” are not strictly confined to kinetic force, but that CIL 
recognizes many non-kinetic effects that can constitute attacks.47 It is 
typically the consequences of an action, not its nature, that determine 
whether it is an attack; thus non-violent operations may be 
encompassed should their consequences prove destructive.48 
Furthermore, a cyber operation need not directly result in death, 
injury, or damage to qualify as an attack; indirectly damaging 
consequences would suffice.49 Indeed, it would be an absurd 
technicality to exclude a cyber operation that indirectly leads to 
widespread death and destruction from being labeled an attack, 
where a kinetic attack that directly leads to the same result would be 
sufficient.50 
Thus, for the purposes of this Article, cyber attacks are 
considered the “hostile use of cyber force” consistent with 
weaponized CNAs and CNDs meant to incapacitate, degrade, 
damage, or destroy a computer, computer network, website, data 
resident therein, or cause extrinsic damage to the target computer or 
network.51 
However one formulates the definition of a cyber attack, it is 
essential to recognize the medium’s technological nature. 
Fundamental to properly evaluating cyber attacks as warfare is a 
basic understanding of how information is transmitted via the 
Internet. Digital transmissions through cyberspace can be 
far-reaching and span the globe near instantaneously, with the tools 
required being widely available and relatively easy and cheap to 
acquire.52 The Internet itself is not a physical structure, but a 
46. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 106.
47. For example, chemical, biological, or radiological attacks usually do not have kinetic
effects, but are universally agreed as constituting “attacks” under the LOAC. Id. 
48. Article 51 of Additional Protocol I expressly characterizes attacks as causing “loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof.” Additional 
Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 51. By emphasizing the consequences of an attack without 
expressly delineating the form of an attack, it is suggested that the LOAC sought to encompass 
many different means that could result in destructive ends. 
49. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 107.
50. See id.
51. Roscini, supra note 6, at 96.
52. Id. at 87–88; see also MELZER, supra note 9, at 5 (“Cyberspace not being subject to
geopolitical or natural boundaries, information and electronic payloads are deployed 
instantaneously between any point of origin and any destination connected through the 
electromagnetic spectrum.”). 
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“network of networks,” or inter-network, and communication links 
following specific rules, or protocols, that allow computers and 
computer networks to exchange information.53 The public Internet is 
just one of many thousands of inter-networks, which include many 
private inter-networks utilized by businesses and governments to 
connect remote locations.54  
To communicate with one another, millions of individual host 
computers and computer networks utilize the Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) to send and receive data.55 
Before being transmitted over the Internet, a host computer breaks up 
a data message, such as an email or video file, into many small 
packets, which are then independently routed to a recipient 
machine.56 Through such “packet switching,” each individual data 
fragment travels from the host computer to any number of other 
interconnected computers, networks, and routers composing the 
Internet until all of the packets reach their destination, often out of 
order, where the recipient machine reconstitutes the packets back 
into a single message.57 The routes of individual packets are wholly 
unpredictable, with each packet potentially taking any one of a 
nearly innumerable array of alternate paths between routers around 
the world.58 In this way, the Internet is decentralized, with no central 
server managing the traffic, nor any single entity wielding control or 
state wielding jurisdiction over all information conveyed.59 By 
adopting the TCP/IP protocol for formatting, addressing, 
transmitting, routing, and receiving information packets, the Internet 
is a “survivable” network where each connected computer takes part 
in the transmission of information.60 Unlike a system with a single 
master routing process, cyberspace can continue to function even if 
individual machines connected to it become damaged or 
incapacitated.61 
53. PATRICIA L. BELLIA ET AL., CYBERLAW PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE 17 (4th ed. 2011). 
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 19.
57. Id. at 18–19; see also MELZER, supra note 9, at 5.
58. See BELLIA ET AL., supra note 53, at 18.
59. Id. at 17; Gervais, supra note 27, at 529.
60. See BELLIA ET AL., supra note 53, at 18.
61. Id.
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In contrast to traditional domains of warfare, cyberspace itself is 
the only entirely man-made domain.62 As a result, it is maintained 
and operated by private and public entities, and can change in 
character very rapidly due to advancements in technology.63 Among 
other technological attributes, the rapid pace at which cyberspace is 
expanding and cyber operations become more sophisticated has 
made the application of the LOAC difficult and unwieldy.64 
III. THE PROBLEM OF ATTRIBUTION
Though cyberspace is theoretically accessible to all, tracing 
information transmitted through it can be particularly difficult.65 
Tactics such as IP spoofing66 and the use of botnets67 allow users to 
hide or counterfeit the true origin of an operation, making 
identification of perpetrators and attribution to states unreliable.68 
Two layers of anonymity must then be unraveled: (1) determining 
the identity of the individual operator of the cyber attack, and (2) 
determining whether the operator is a state actor (for example, a 
member of the military) or non-state actor whose conduct is 
attributable to the state.69 In situations where the cyber attack clearly 
emanated from a state actor, attribution is simple; however, most 
cyber attacks tend to be conducted by individual non-state actors, 
which renders attribution extremely difficult.70 
When the origin of an unlawful cyber attack has been traced to 
non-state actors, a victim state would need to prove another state 
exhibited sufficient control over the non-state actors before holding 
that state responsible.71 However, the appropriate threshold of 
control required is a point of contention.72 In traditional military 
62. MELZER, supra note 9, at 5.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. IP spoofing is the creation of data packets with a forged source IP address, with the
purpose of concealing the identity of the sender or impersonating another computer system. Id. at 
5 n.6. 
67. A botnet is an interconnected series of compromised computers used for malicious
purposes. A computer becomes a bot when it runs a file that has bot software embedded in it. Id. 
at 5 n.7. 
68. Roscini, supra note 6, at 96.
69. See id.
70. See Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 855.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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contexts, two tests have been developed to determine whether actions 
by private non-state actors can be attributed to a supporting state.73 
The “effective control” and “overall control” tests are difficult to 
apply in a CNA context, though, and represent too high of a bar to 
effectively determine when a state may be responsible for the cyber 
attacks of a non-state actor.74 
In Nicaragua v. United States,75 the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) administered an “effective control” test to determine 
that the actions of Nicaraguan rebels, including the killing, 
wounding, and kidnapping of Nicaraguan citizens, could not be 
attributed to the United States.76 Despite the United States’ supplying 
the rebels with arms and helping to plan offenses, the ICJ found the 
exhibited level of control insufficiently complete.77 Thus, the United 
States could not be held accountable for the war crimes as a 
belligerent.78 In its ruling, the ICJ set a very high standard for 
holding a state responsible for the actions of non-state actors.79 “The 
effective control test requires a state to essentially be in total control 
of the non-state actors, and . . . specifically direct or enforce 
violations of international law.”80 Despite recognizing that the 
United States planned, collaborated, financed, trained, and supplied 
at least one of the rebel groups, the court was unable to conclude that 
rebels were acting on the United States' behalf because of the lack of 
total control.81 
Thirteen years after Nicaragua, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) decided Prosecutor v. 
Tadić,82 in which it implemented an “overall control” test with a less 
stringent threshold than the effective control test.83 In determining 
whether to impute the acts of non-state actors to a state, the ICTY 
decided it “must be proved that the State wields overall control . . . 
73. Allan, supra note 24, at 60.
74. Id.
75. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 181 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
76. Allan, supra note 24, at 65–66.
77. Id. at 66.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 67.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
83. Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 855–56.
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by equipping and financing . . . [and] by coordinating or helping in 
the general planning of [the] military activity,” but concluded that 
the state did not necessarily have to give “instructions for the 
commission of specific acts contrary to international law.”84 The 
ICTY also qualified the test by highlighting the importance of 
location, requiring additional evidence of genuine control over 
direction and planning if the unlawful acts are committed in the 
territory of a state other than the controlling state.85 The court also 
required a higher level of control for non-militarily organized groups 
than for militarily organized groups, necessitating that the former be 
given specific instructions by the state that lead to unlawful acts, or 
that the state endorse such acts after the fact.86 In contrast to the 
effective control test, the overall control test is a more lenient 
standard that, in some circumstances, does not require that a state 
exhibit complete control over every action by the non-state actors.87 
Rather, the overall control test generally requires that a state finance, 
equip, and generally plan military activities of non-state actors before 
subsequent unlawful actions can be attributed to the state.88 
In the context of a cyber attack, however, attempting to apply 
either test to prove attribution of state responsibility will likely fail. 
For example, the 2008 cyber attacks on Georgia are presumed to be 
the work of organized crime groups working on the Russian 
government’s behalf; nonetheless, under either test it would be 
impossible to legally attribute the actions to Russia.89 First, no 
evidence has been found connecting Russia and the organized crime 
groups, or the hackers employed.90 Second, limited facts exist 
demonstrating the Russian government exhibited any control over 
the botnets used to attack websites.91 Although Russia engaged in 
traditional military operations contemporaneous to the cyber attacks, 
that corroborative evidence alone is insufficient to establish 
attribution.92 Under the effective control test, there is woefully 
84. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 131 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
85. Allan, supra note 24, at 69.
86. Id. at 70.
87. See Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 855–56.
88. Tadić, Judgment, ¶ 131.
89. Allan, supra note 24, at 57.
90. Id. at 75.
91. Id.
92. See id.
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insufficient evidence that the Russian government exhibited the 
requisite degree of control over the cyber attacks. Application of the 
overall control test leads to a similar result.93 Even under this 
less-stringent test, the tenuous connection between the Russian 
government and the organized crime groups impedes attribution 
because insufficient evidence exists to establish that Russia 
equipped, financed, or helped plan the cyber attacks, or that it 
endorsed them after the fact.94 Considering the hackers who carried 
out the attacks at the organized crime groups’ direction likely used 
their own equipment, Internet connections, and malware, searching 
for links to the Russian government appears futile. 
Besides, scholars disagree whether either Nicaragua or Tadić 
are internationally controlling, which makes their application to 
cyber attack conflicts even more dubious.95 The Tallinn Manual 
glosses over the attribution problem, merely noting the Nicaragua 
and Tadić tests without prescribing anything to mitigate the obstacles 
associated with applying the tests to cyber attacks.96 Failing to 
address anonymity in cyberspace and the prevalent lack of evidence 
of state control quickly renders further analysis of cyber attacks 
under the jus ad bellum or jus in bello unproductive. 
Ultimately, there will likely be frequent uncertainty whether a 
victim-state of a cyber attack is targeting the correct state for 
counter-measures. To avoid committing their own violations of 
international law, a victim-state may therefore allow non-attributable 
cyber attacks perpetrated at the direction of states to go unchecked 
and unpunished. Plus, the low cost of cyber attacks, the ease with 
which they can be carried out, and the fact that cyber attacks can be 
forged to appear to originate from an unrelated country frustrate the 
existing attribution regime to the point of potentially precluding 
further analysis under the jus ad bellum or jus in bello. 
93. Id. at 76.
94. Id.
95. See Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 856 (noting that “after 9/11, international law held
Afghanistan accountable because it failed to uphold its duties to prevent al Qaeda from harming 
other states from its territory . . . [and] . . . liable for terrorists attacks carried out by a non-state 
actor that no one argued was an agent of Afghanistan”). 
96. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 32 and n.48. (preferring the effective control test
under the commentary to Rule 6). 
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IV. WHETHER CYBER ATTACKS CAN RISE TO
THE LEVEL OF A USE OF FORCE OR ARMED
ATTACK UNDER THE JUS AD BELLUM 
Assuming attribution is not a problem, then determining whether 
a cyber attack is unlawful requires an understanding of how force is 
defined in international law, and if a cyber attack is capable of 
reaching the threshold level to meet that definition.97 U.N. Charter 
Article 2(4) prohibits member states from engaging in “the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.”98 While Article 2(4) does not expressly define 
“force,” a reading of the U.N. Charter makes clear that “at either end 
of the spectrum, it is apparent what is force and what is not force.”99 
On one end, traditional military force using conventional military 
weapons clearly constitutes a use of force.100 On the other end, 
political or economic coercion does not constitute a use of force,101 
as the purpose of the United Nations and the U.N. Charter “is to 
maintain international peace and security” and “to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war.”102 By excluding economic and 
political coercion from the definition of force, the drafters indicated 
that uses of force in violation of Article 2(4) focus strictly on military 
instruments.103 The boundary between a use of force and a non-use 
of force therefore lies within the area between an exercise of 
traditional military coercion and an exercise of political or economic 
coercion.104 Although the U.N. Charter is binding only on member 
states, the prohibition against the threat or use of force has been 
accepted as customary international law and binds all states 
regardless of U.N. membership.105 
97. See Gervais, supra note 27, at 535–36.
98. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
99. Reese Nguyen, Navigating Jus Ad Bellum in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 101 CALIF. L.
REV. 1079, 1113 (2013) (emphasis omitted). 
100. See id. at 1113–14 (noting that under the U.N. Charter “force” encompasses “armed
force” and the “use of conventional military weapons”). 
101. Id. at 1114. “State practice supports these understandings: the United States, among
other nations, has used forms of economic and political coercion since the early days of the 
Charter largely without legal challenge.” Id. 
102. Gervais, supra note 27, at 536.
103. Id. at 537.
104. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1114.
105. Id. at 1112–13.
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The ICJ has stated that U.N. Charter Articles 2(4) and 51, which 
recognizes the inherent right of self-defense against armed attacks,106 
apply to “any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed.”107 
Although non-binding, ICJ advisory opinions are persuasive legal 
authority108 in the international community and suggest the jus ad 
bellum encompasses all forms of force, including tactics used in 
cyberspace.109 Accordingly, the United States takes the position that 
during peacetime, a cyber attack may qualify as a use of force.110 
The drafters of the U.N. Charter deliberately excluded economic 
coercion from the definition of force in Article 2(4), focusing instead 
on military instruments.111 The U.N. Charter’s travaux préparatoires 
and the drafting histories of subsequent U.N. resolutions also 
indicate that traditional military coercion is the quintessential 
example of force.112 However, the Charter does not explicitly define 
this distinction, which is further obfuscated by another necessary 
differentiation between a use of force and an armed attack.113 An 
armed attack is a use of force so egregious that the victim would be 
justified in responding with force in self-defense.114 A state may 
lawfully resort to self-defense only when a use of force reaches this 
level, which is consistent with the ICJ’s stance115 that “there is a 
substantive distinction between the ‘use of force’ and an ‘armed 
attack.’”116 Conventional notions suggest that “even small-scale 
bombings, artillery, naval or aerial attacks qualify as ‘armed attacks’ 
activating Article 51, as long as they result in, or are capable of 
106. U.N. Charter art. 51.
107. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
244, ¶ 39 (July 8). 
108. Advisory Jurisdiction, INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1
=5&p2=2 (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). 
109. See Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 854 (“A cyber operation that constitutes a use of force
under Article 2(4) is an internationally wrongful act.”). 
110. See THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE 9 (2011) (“The
development of norms for state conduct in cyberspace does not require a reinvention of 
customary international law, nor does it render existing international norms obsolete. 
Long-standing international norms guiding State behavior—in times of peace and conflict—also 
apply in cyberspace.”). 
111. See Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1114.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1115.
114. See Shackelford, supra note 5, at 230–31.
115. Nicaragua, supra note 75, ¶ 195 (indicating that the difference between a use of force
and an armed attack is one of “scale and effects”). 
116. Gervais, supra note 27, at 542.
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resulting in, destruction of property or loss of lives.”117 “By contrast, 
the firing of a single missile into some unpopulated wilderness as a 
mere display of force would likely not be sufficient to trigger Article 
51, despite violating Article 2(4).”118 Thus, a victim-state seeking to 
use force in self-defense for a cyber attack must prove: (1) the attack 
rose to a level analogous to a traditional armed attack by military 
forces, and (2) the attack can be attributed to a state.119 U.N. Security 
Council Resolutions 1368120 and 1373121 also suggest that attacks by 
individual non-state actors can trigger the right to self-defense.122 In 
either case, as mentioned in Part III above, attributing a cyber attack 
to either a state or an individual non-state actor becomes extremely 
difficult when online anonymity and IP tracing may not necessarily 
implicate a culprit.123 
The Tallinn Manual freely admits “cyber activities that occur 
below the ‘use of force’ (as this term is understood in the jus ad 
bellum) . . . have not been addressed in any detail.”124 This curious 
admission ignores the indefinite line CNAs and CNDs straddle 
between forceful and non-forceful coercion.125 Specifically, because 
current manifestations of cyber attacks—such as DDoS disruptions, 
tracking malware, website defacement, etc.—can be non-destructive, 
such attacks would not rise to the level of a use of force under the jus 
ad bellum.126 Cyber attacks’ effects could greatly vary as they 
become more sophisticated, with potential results ranging from 
minor disruptions (website inoperability) to more debilitating or even 
117. Id. at 543.
118. Id.
119. Shackelford, supra note 5, at 230–31. See Part II, supra, for a discussion on the
difficulties of attributing cyber attacks to states. 
120. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
121. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
122. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 120 (condemning the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks that took place in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania, and recognizing the 
inherent right of self-defense); S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 121 (reaffirming the recognition of the 
inherent right of self-defense in response to terrorist acts such as that of September 11, 2001). 
123. A state’s infrastructure may be used unknowingly by private “hacktivists” because IP
routing is ad hoc, unpredictable, and capable of transferring packets through multiple countries to 
its destination. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. Additionally, IP “spoofing” may 
fraudulently implicate an innocent state or individual. Id.; see Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 831 
(noting “international law has not provided a clear standard for when a victim state may use force 
in self-defense against a non-state actor”). 
124. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 4.
125. See Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1084, 1114.
126. See Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1127.
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destructive consequences, such as: disabling power generators; 
cutting off military command, control, and communication systems; 
train derailments; airplane crashes; nuclear reactor meltdowns; or 
weapons malfunctions.127 However, to analogize most current CNAs 
with kinetic military force as implied by Article 2(4) would expand 
the definition far beyond what the drafters intended.128 Because the 
drafters excluded economic, ideological, and political coercion from 
the definition of force, their intent to focus on military instruments is 
evident.129 Even in the unlikely event a cyber attack does meet the 
use-of-force definition, another question arises: whether the use of 
force rises to the level of an armed attack, thereby triggering a state’s 
right to forcefully respond in self-defense to end the ongoing 
violation.130 
A tangential problem arises when a CNA that appears facially 
non-destructive indirectly leads to loss of life or property.131 Though 
rare, these types of CNAs would qualify as uses of force because 
they are analogous to traditional military coercion that lead to loss of 
life or property, but the same cannot be said when the CNA’s effects 
are equivocally economic and military coercion.132 In any case, 
several states have adopted the view that “cyber force is a type of 
armed force,”133 accepting the premise that cyber operations can 
function on the same plane as traditional military force and thus falls 
under the purview of the jus ad bellum.134 
The need to make sense of this categorical quagmire and 
identify what cyber activities qualify as uses of force and armed 
127. Roscini, supra note 6, at 87–88.
128. Gervais, supra note 27, at 537.
129. Id.
130. For example, in the case of the 2007 Estonia attacks, to date no international consensus
exists as to whether the Estonian government’s options for retaliation would have been traditional 
military force, cyber attacks in-kind, or other non-violent measures such as reparations. 
Shackelford, supra note 5, at 196. 
131. Gervais, supra note 28, at 543.
132. Compare id. at 537 (noting that cyber weapons can have versatile and innumerable
effects that complicate categorization, but to treat “all forms of cyber attack as a use of force 
would require an implausibly broad reading of Article 2(4) that includes non-physical damage”), 
with Roscini, supra note 6, at 107–08 (analogizing that “if the Stock Exchange or other financial 
institutions were to be bombed . . . this would certainly be considered a use of armed force, and 
not economic coercion, even though the economic consequences of the action would by far 
outweigh the physical damage . . . one cannot see why the same conclusion should not apply 
when the Stock Exchange . . . is shut down by a cyber attack”). 
133. Roscini, supra note 6, at 108. The United States is among such states. Id. at 108–09.
134. See id. at 107–09.
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attacks has led to the development of several analytical approaches: 
(1) an instrument-based approach, (2) a target-based approach, and
(3) an effects-based approach.135 The Tallinn Manual specifically
references the effects-based approach,136 but all three are rife with
their own idiosyncratic flaws.
A. The Instrument-Based Approach
The instrument-based approach looks at the mode of attack and 
whether the weapon used possesses “physical characteristics 
traditionally associated with military coercion.”137 Thus, “The more 
analogous a new weapon is to conventional forms of military force, 
the more likely its operation will constitute a ‘use of force’ or ‘armed 
attack.’”138 This approach is derived from a textualist reading of the 
U.N. Charter.139 “The Charter uses the terms ‘use force,’ ‘armed 
force,’ and ‘armed forces’ interchangeably,” specifying that “armed 
force is action by air, sea, or land forces,” which includes 
“demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land 
forces” but does not include “complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations.”140 
Under this reading, it would appear the Charter’s drafters 
understood that force meant traditional military armed force and 
excluded other forms of coercion.141 This view is strengthened by the 
U.N. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, which includes 
armed invasions, port blockades, bombardments, and armed 
violations of territory.142 Each of these examples involves physical 
force and violations of territoriality.143 By this definition then, cyber 
attacks are not capable of rising to the levels of uses of force or 
armed attacks because computer code is neither a physical nor a 
135. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1117.
136. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 45.
137. Hollis, supra note 4, at 1041.
138. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1117.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1118 (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id.
142. Id.; Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 29/3314, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RESRes/29/3314
(Dec. 14, 1974). 
143. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1118.
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conventional military force.144 By narrowly restricting the definition 
of force, the instrument-based approach is rigid and inflexible, 
requiring that new, unconventional forms of attack be dealt with 
through new international agreement, which may take decades to 
accomplish.145 
To illustrate the instrument-based approach’s shortcomings, the 
DDoS attacks upon Estonia in 2007 and the use of the Stuxnet worm 
on Iran’s nuclear facility in 2010 would not be considered uses of 
force, despite having inflicted widespread disruption, because they 
were not accomplished using conventional kinetic weaponry.146 Even 
cyber attacks that result in tangible physical destruction would be 
outside the purview of the jus ad bellum under this approach.147 
Given the ubiquitous nature of cyberspace and its critical position in 
modern society, this narrow approach swiftly loses any usefulness 
and relevance. 
B. The Target-Based Approach
The target-based approach takes the opposite tack: it looks at the 
object of attack, and “automatically treats any cyber attack against 
critical . . . infrastructure as an armed attack because of the potential 
for severe consequences if such [infrastructure were] disabled.”148 
Under this approach, emphasis is put on the status of the target, with 
“critical infrastructure” given privileged significance.149 If an attack 
is made on critical infrastructure, it would trigger a state’s right to 
self-defense, regardless of whether it comports with traditional 
military force.150 
The problem with the target-based approach, however, is that 
each state individually defines what constitutes its critical 
infrastructure.151 The United States, for example, designates sixteen 
sectors as critical infrastructure, including “food and agriculture, 
banking and finance, commercial facilities, communications, 
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1119.
147. See id. at 1118. Cyber attacks are neither physical, nor conventional military weapons
and “[t]he instrument-based view differentiates based on the nature of the assault, regardless of 
the consequences.” Id. 
148. Id. at 1117, 1119 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 1119.
150. Id. at 1120.
151. Id. at 1119.
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healthcare, and transportation” facilities.152 While this approach 
takes into consideration a CNA’s potential for non-physical 
disruption of national security, it is extremely broad.153 Under this 
approach, nearly any cyber attack other than one targeting an 
individual personal computer would qualify as an armed attack.154 If 
states can designate almost anything as critical infrastructure, the 
significance of the threshold between a use of force and an armed 
attack is obliterated.155 Any cyber attack upon critical infrastructure, 
no matter how innocuous, would trigger a victim-state’s right to 
self-defense, likely increasing the number of forceful exchanges 
between states.156 
Moreover, such a broad approach incorrectly assumes that every 
invasion of a critical infrastructure demonstrates hostile intent to 
attack.157 As previously mentioned, computer network exploitations 
(CNEs) are presumed lawful and do not demonstrate an intent to 
inflict damage, but are simply intelligence-gathering techniques.158 
Yet under a target-based approach, they would be considered armed 
attacks if perpetrated against a critical infrastructure.159 Again, this 
approach may lead far too many states to invoke otherwise 
unreasonable Article 51 self-defense reprisals for cyber attacks with 
effects that clearly do not warrant such a response.160 
For example, the cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007, despite 
having resulted in no physical damage, injury, or death, would be 
considered an armed attack under this rubric.161 As a result, Estonia 
would have been entitled to forceful self-defense measures in 
retaliation for rendering newspaper and other websites temporarily 
152. Id. at 1119–20; Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure, Security and
Resilience, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office 
/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
153. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1120.
154. Id. at 1121.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. Id..
158. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
159. See Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1121. Under this approach, even cyber attacks designed
for data-mining and information theft (espionage) could justify anticipatory self-defense. Id. 
160. See id. (noting that any cyber attack, regardless of benignity, would permit responsive
force); Gervais, supra note 27, at 541 (“[A target-based approach] raises the possibility of 
wrongly escalating force in response to a low-level cyber attack.”). 
161. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1121.
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inoperable.162 The Syrian Electronic Army’s benign attacks on 
Twitter, Skype, The New York Times, and CNN in 2013 would have 
also justified the United States in exercising self-defense 
measures.163 Whether retaliatory measures would be strictly limited 
to CNAs or would also allow traditional military force is unclear, but 
in the event of the latter, such disproportionality between attack and 
response could trigger international repercussions.164 Under the 
target-based approach, the Stuxnet virus that temporarily shut down 
Iran’s nuclear facility may have constituted an armed attack, 
permitting Iran to use forceful counter-measures against both the 
United States and Israel, which would likely have escalated 
already-simmering tensions into full-scale war.165 Despite its ability 
to accommodate the unorthodox attributes of cyber operations, the 
target-based approach would likely foster far more trouble than it 
prevents. 
C. The Effects-Based Approach
Finally, the effects-based approach analyzes the consequences of 
an attack to determine whether it rises to the level of a use of force or 
armed attack.166 The Tallinn Manual uses the “scale and effects” test 
as promulgated in Nicaragua.167 This approach involves analogizing 
the effects of a cyber attack with the effects of a conventional 
weapons attack, filtering out “the most grave forms of the use of 
force . . . from other less grave forms.”168 Therefore, a cyber attack 
that produces physical destruction similar to that produced by a 
kinetic attack is more likely to qualify as an armed attack, while one 
that produces political or economic coercion will not (in accordance 
with U.N. Charter policy).169 However, Nicaragua did not specify 
the factors used to make such a determination.170 Furthermore, the 
162. See id.
163. Christine Haughney & Nicole Perlroth, Times Site Is Disrupted in Attack by Hackers,
N.Y. TIMES, August 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/business/media/hacking-
attack-is-suspected-on-times-web-site.html; Nicole Perlroth, Hunting for Syrian Hackers’ Chain 
of Command, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/18/technology 
/financial-times-site-is-hacked.html?pagewanted=all. 
164. See Gervais, supra note 27, at 541.
165. See Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1121.
166. Id. at 1121–22.
167. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 55.
168. Nicaragua, supra note 75, para. 191.
169. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1122.
170. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 55.
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ICJ does not have binding authority on any parties other than the 
parties involved in the particular case adjudicated.171 As a result, the 
“scale and effects” test is not necessarily the mandated test for 
categorizing uses of force and armed attacks, but in the context of 
cyber attacks it has become the most widely accepted.172 
Michael Schmitt, editor of the Tallinn Manual, developed the 
most prominent effects-based approach consisting of six factors: 
(1) severity, (2) immediacy, (3) directness, (4) invasiveness, (5)
measurability, and (6) presumptive legitimacy.173 Under these
criteria, the stronger the first five factors are, the more likely a cyber
attack would be deemed a use of force; however, the stronger the
sixth factor is, the less likely it is to be a use of force.174 Although the
effects-based approach carves a middle ground between the rigid
instrument-based approach and the overbroad target-based approach,
this particular test allows almost any cyber attack to be argued on the
side of force.175 Little clarification of the weight afforded each factor
is provided, other than Schmitt himself citing severity as the most
significant.176
In addition, such analysis may lead to contradictory 
interpretations of the same event. A CNA against a state lacking 
effective cybersecurity may cause enough damage to rise to the level 
of an armed attack, yet the same CNA against another state with 
robust cybersecurity might not.177 Such a subjective approach may 
prove to be an impractical method to place cyber attacks on the same 
plane as conventional weaponry. On the other hand, a state with 
adequate cybersecurity may have little need to resort to self-defense 
measures afforded under Article 51 if a CNA proves ineffective or 
even goes unnoticed. A state vulnerable to cyber attacks that suffers 
legitimate harm, though, may rely heavily on Article 51, which may 
be its only practical deterrent to being victimized. 
171. See Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org
/information/index.php?p1=7&p2=2#6 (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
172. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1122.
173. Id. at 1122–23 (citing Michael Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force
in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 
914–15 (1999)). 
174. Id. at 1123. The sixth factor, presumptive legitimacy, hinges on whether it is a
permissible form of coercion or not (e.g., economic versus military). Id. 
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1124.
Spring 2015] SILENCING THE CALL TO ARMS 993 
The Tallinn Manual notes that in some cases, the distinction is 
clear: 
any use of force that injures or kills persons or damages or 
destroys property would satisfy the scale and effects 
requirement. . . . [A]lso . . . acts of cyber intelligence 
gathering and cyber theft, as well as cyber operations that 
involve brief or periodic interruption of non-essential cyber 
services, do not qualify as armed attacks.178 
Yet, the Tallinn experts concede that “the law is unclear as to the 
precise point at which the extent of death, injury, damage, 
destruction, or suffering caused by a cyber operation fails to qualify 
as an armed attack.”179 Murkier still is the case of a cyber attack that 
does not result in direct physical injury, death, damage, or 
destruction, yet nonetheless has overwhelming negative effects, such 
as the crashing of a stock exchange.180 Normally, such non-violent 
coercion would not be considered an armed attack.181 Given current 
large-scale dependence on the Internet, however, such a crash could 
have a crippling effect on essential functions on which our society 
and government depend.182 
The Tallinn experts also admit that under the effects-based 
rubric to date, “no international cyber incidents have . . . been 
unambiguously and publicly characterized by the international 
community as reaching the threshold of an armed attack.”183 Among 
the cyber events in Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), and Iran (2010), 
only the Iranian Stuxnet incident presents a close call because it 
resulted in physical damage that rendered 1,000 of 5,000 centrifuges 
temporarily inoperable.184 Yet there is no international consensus 
that even the Stuxnet event constituted an armed attack.185 
Ultimately, this reality points less to the inadequacy of the 
effects-based approach as a mode of analysis, and more to the 
likelihood that “cyberwarfare” is a misnomer and that characteristics 
178. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 55.
179. Id. at 56.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 57.
184. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1098 n.132.
185. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 57.
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of CNAs and CNDs may place them outside the bounds of the jus ad 
bellum. 
V. CYBER ATTACKS AND COMPLIANCE
UNDER THE JUS IN BELLO 
The jus in bello (or LOAC) regulates the conduct of hostilities 
during an armed conflict.186 Formed through a long-standing history 
of international treaties and CIL, the LOAC articulates the rules 
states rely on to determine whether their forceful conduct is 
lawful.187 Central to the LOAC are the principles of distinction and 
proportionality and the law of neutrality.188 In the context of 
cyberspace, questions arise concerning the proper means and 
methods of deploying CNAs so as to be in compliance with the 
LOAC’s fundamental principles.189 Part A of this section evaluates 
three sub-issues pertaining to the principle of distinction and 
proportionality: (1) how cyber combatants can distinguish their 
combatant status, (2) how combatants can distinguish between 
civilian and military objectives in cyberspace, and (3) whether cyber 
attacks are indiscriminate. Finally, Part B analyzes whether the 
architecture of cyberspace renders neutrality compliance unfeasible. 
A. Whether Cyber Attacks Comply with the Principles
of Distinction and Proportionality 
A foundational principle of the LOAC is the principle of 
distinction, which requires attackers to “distinguish between the 
civilian population and combatants, and between civilian objects and 
military objectives” at all times.190 This ensures that “the civilian 
population and individual citizens shall enjoy general protection 
against dangers arising from military operations”191 without being 
made “the object of attack.”192 Even so, some civilian casualties are 
permissible as collateral damage during a military operation if the 
attacker made reasonable efforts to balance other foundational 
186. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1083 n.22 (citing Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The
Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 49, 52 
(1994)). 
187. Gervais, supra note 27, at 535.
188. Id. at 563.
189. Id. at 549.
190. Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 48.
191. Id. art. 51.
192. Id.
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principles of military necessity and humanity.193 Such allowance for 
collateral damage lies at the heart of the principle of 
proportionality.194 Inadvertent or incidental civilian casualties and 
damages that are not excessive in relation to the anticipated military 
advantage are lawful.195 However, should a planned attack be 
expected to result in excessive civilian casualties or damage, 
commanders are required to cancel, suspend, or re-plan the attack.196 
Conducting attacks in cyberspace makes complying with the 
principles of distinction and proportionality problematic.197 The line 
between military and civilian targets in a cyber attack can be blurred 
and difficult to discern.198 This is because cyberspace relies heavily 
on private civilian infrastructure.199 Cyberinfrastructure is “spread 
and networked across the entire planet,” making civilian and military 
cyberinfrastructure tightly interconnected.200 
Accordingly, several issues need to be analyzed to determine 
whether cyber attacks comply with the principles of distinction and 
proportionality including: (1) whether cyber combatants properly 
distinguish themselves as military combatants, (2) whether cyber 
combatants properly distinguish between military and cyber 
objectives, and (3) whether cyber attacks are indiscriminate. 
1. Distinguishing Cyber Combatant Status
The LOAC gives only lawful combatants the legal right to 
participate directly in hostilities.201 Lawful combatants receive 
immunity from prosecution for acts that might otherwise incur 
criminal liability under domestic law, such as the right to kill enemy 
forces or attack military objectives.202 Typically, uniformed members 
193. Established by CIL, military necessity is the principle that permits states engaged in
armed conflict to use only the degree of force, not otherwise prohibited by the LOAC, required to 
achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict. Id. art. 51. The principle of humanity forbids the 
infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of 
legitimate military purposes. Id. art. 35. 
194. See Gervais, supra note 27, at 569.
195. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 51.
196. See id.
197. Gervais, supra note 27, at 565.
198. Id.
199. MELZER, supra note 9, at 30.
200. Id.
201. Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 43.2.
202. Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of
Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 179, 190 (2006). 
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of the military are considered lawful combatants, so long as: (1) they 
are commanded by a person responsible for subordinates; (2) they 
wear a fixed emblem recognizable at a distance; (3) they carry their 
arms openly; and (4) they conduct their operations in accordance 
with the laws and customs of war.203 In this way, military combatants 
are required to “distinguish themselves from the civilian population 
while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation 
preparatory to an attack.”204 Because this requirement is typically 
met by wearing military uniforms and openly carrying weapons, 
compliance may not be readily discernible in cyberspace: combatants 
can launch cyber attacks unobserved, and the weaponized nature of 
data transmissions can go undetected.205 
The Tallinn Manual correctly states that if cyber operations are 
to be treated as warfare, then combatants engaged in cyber 
operations should not be exempt from displaying their combatant 
status.206 The Tallinn experts also noted that CIL offers no definitive 
exceptions to this rule, regardless of circumstances.207 However, 
some Tallinn experts did express support for a possible exception 
under CIL, namely that the requirement only applies where failure to 
wear a fixed distinctive sign would reasonably prevent an attacker 
from distinguishing between civilians and combatants.208 Under such 
an exception, the requirement should only apply in circumstances 
where civilian and military persons and facilities co-exist and a 
heightened risk of mistaken civilian targeting is present.209 Omitted 
from the discussion is whether a cyber attack itself should be marked 
to signal military status, similar to the marking of warships or 
military aircrafts.210 Military forces are obligated to distinguish 
themselves from civilians, and common practice dictates that states 
203. Regulations Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277; Annex to Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2295, 205 Consol. T.S. 277. 
204. Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 44.3.
205. Id.
206. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 99.
207. Id. Regardless of factors such as “distance from the area of operations or clear separation
from the civilian population,” compliance with this requirement must be met to maintain 
combatant status. Id. 
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See id.
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further distinguish protected persons and sites within their 
military.211 
The Tallinn Manual narrowly views distinguishing combatant 
status as merely requiring uniformed cyber combatants.212 Some 
critics argue that requiring cyber combatants to wear uniforms is 
inadequate and nonsensical in the cyberspace context.213 But a few 
simple alternatives exist to facilitate CNA compliance, such as 
creating universally recognized electronic identifiers that signal the 
status of persons or facilities that generated the transmission.214 One 
straightforward solution might require the usage of a “.mil” 
extension for transmissions emanating from networks associated 
with the military.215 Although this method may be ripe for abuse, the 
same can be said for traditional identifiers like military uniforms (or 
the lack thereof).216 Here, the rules governing lawful ruses and 
unlawful perfidy will dictate the bounds of covertness that a cyber 
combatant may lawfully employ.217 
Ruses are permissible strategies under the LOAC, and include 
the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations, and misinformation 
to lead an enemy to make tactical mistakes.218 Deception is key to a 
ruse’s effectiveness.219 In cyberspace, a ruse may take the form of a 
misinformation campaign, implemented by intentionally making 
misleading military documents unsecure in a military database.220 In 
contrast, perfidy is prohibited by the LOAC and involves “[a]cts 
inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he 
is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the [LOAC], 
with intent to betray that confidence.”221 Common examples of 
perfidy include feigning civilian, or other non-combatant status.222 
Thus, requiring open display of a “.mil” extension may impinge on a 
cyber combatant’s ability to remain covert in its cyber attack, 
211. Brown, supra note 202, at 196.
212. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 99.
213. Gervais, supra note 27, at 560.
214. Brown, supra note 202, at 196.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Gervais, supra note 27, at 559–60.
218. Id. (citing Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 37).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 560 (citing Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 37).
222. Id.
998 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:969 
rendering the cyber attack non-perfidious and in compliance with the 
LOAC.223 
A more sophisticated method of distinguishing cyber combatant 
status may be using an identifying line of code, which may preserve 
the ability to employ lawful ruses in cyberspace.224 A cyber 
combatant could employ a cyber attack utilizing an otherwise 
innocuous extension, such as “.com,” while the source code is 
embedded with a line distinguishing the communication as military 
in nature.225 Similar to camouflage, the cyber attack can exercise 
deception and maintain status as a lawful ruse.226 Covertness does 
not necessarily transform an otherwise lawful attack into a violation 
of the LOAC, so long as the attack remains on the lawful side of 
perfidy.227 The same principles should apply in cyberspace, as the 
“[LOAC rules] are designed to regulate the use of force and 
moderate its consequences,” thereby maintaining order to war and 
ensuring trust that combatants are utilizing the same protocol.228 By 
requiring states to comply with simple identifying techniques in their 
CNAs, the LOAC would be satisfied,229 cyber combatants would 
preserve their combatant immunity,230 and civilians would be able to 
discern between weaponized CNAs and normal civilian data 
transmissions.231 
2. Distinguishing Between Civilian and Military Objectives
Cyberinfrastructure is characterized by a structural reliance upon
civilian infrastructure.232 Consequently, probable targets of a cyber 
attack are likely to be “dual-use” objects, sharing both a civilian 
purpose and a military purpose during an armed conflict.233 As a 
223. See Brown, supra note 202, at 196; Gervais, supra note 27, at 560 (citing Additional
Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 37). 
224. Gervais, supra note 27, at 560.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 559 (citing Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 37).
227. Id. at 561.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 560.
230. Brown, supra note 202, at 190.
231. Gervais, supra note 27, at 560.
232. MELZER, supra note 9, at 30.
233. Id.; Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues, 87 U.S.
NAVAL WAR C. INT’L LAW STUD. 89, 96 (2011). A civilian object that serves a military purpose 
during an armed conflict becomes a military object eligible for attack. Some traditional examples 
of dual-use infrastructure include bridges and power grids. Gervais, supra note 27, at 568. 
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result, attackers must take a higher level of precaution in identifying 
dual-use objects as potential military objectives, as well as take 
reasonably feasible steps to minimize civilian casualty and 
damage.234 Complying with the principles of distinction and 
proportionality while conducting cyber attacks is complicated by the 
fact that civilian cyberinfrastructure may be unpredictably used for 
military purposes.235 Such variance would make it difficult to 
determine precisely when and where dual-use objects are 
contributing to military action, as well as if their destruction would 
provide a military advantage.236 
Because cyberinfrastructure is composed of dual-use objects, a 
wide array of targets may qualify as military objectives.237 For 
example, a military’s reliance upon “software and hardware 
produced for the civilian population” could make the manufacturers 
vulnerable as legitimate “war-supporting military objectives.”238 
Further, because cyberspace is now an integral aspect of the U.S. 
economy, many financial institutions with cyber presence could be 
characterized as “war-sustaining objects” and thus military 
objectives.239 Some cyber attacks will easily comply with the 
principle of distinction, such as targeting a strictly military air traffic 
control system.240 Other attacks will clearly violate the rule, such as 
targeting hospitals, museums, or places of worship.241 The difficulty 
lies in cases somewhere in the middle, where dual-use facilities are at 
play.242 
The Tallinn Manual recapitulates existing CIL rules regarding 
distinction and proportionality, with the caveat that “determination[s] 
234. MELZER, supra note 9, at 30 (citing Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, arts. 57, 58).
Such precautions include choosing military objects with minimal potential for collateral damage 
(and conversely, abstaining from disproportionate attacks), attempting to remove civilian 
population and objects from the vicinity of military objectives (via warning, evacuation, etc.), and 
avoiding military objectives near densely populated areas (where feasible). Additional Protocol I, 
supra note 17, arts. 57–58. 
235. MELZER, supra note 9, at 30–31.
236. Id.
237. Indeed, 95 percent of all military communications use civilian networks at some stage of
their transfer. Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 852–
53 (2012). 
238. Schmitt, supra note 233, at 96–97.
239. Id. at 97.
240. Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 852.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 852–53.
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of whether an object is a civilian object protected from attack, and 
not a military objective, must be made on a case-by-case basis.”243 
Interestingly enough, a majority of Tallinn experts agreed that 
data should not be considered a military objective.244 However, the 
majority of Tallinn experts did acknowledge that a cyber operation 
that targets data alone may qualify as an attack if it affects the 
functionality of the resident computers or network.245 A minority of 
Tallinn experts balked at the delineation, since mere deletion of 
“extremely valuable and important civilian datasets would 
potentially escape the regulatory reach of the [LOAC].”246 For these 
experts, the severity of the harm was paramount, but the majority 
characterized this concern as de lege ferenda.247 
On the topic of cyberspace’s dual civilian and military nature, 
the Tallinn experts recognized that “all dual-use objects and facilities 
are military objectives, without qualification;”248 however, they 
downplay the extensive ramifications of that statement. The Tallinn 
experts acknowledged that “[i]t may be impossible to know over 
which part of the network military transmissions . . . will pass,” but 
rejected the inevitable conclusion that the entire Internet could be 
deemed a military objective in time of war as “so highly unlikely as 
to render the possibility purely theoretical.”249 Theoretical or not, 
destroying the entire Internet as a military objective is analogous to 
destroying an entire array of roads when it is unknown which one the 
enemy will take.250 To dismiss that possibility appears shortsighted 
given that data packets take unknowable paths through 
cyberspace.251 This hypothetical doomsday scenario for the entire 
Internet might simply be an inevitable result of transposing LOAC 
rules onto cyberspace. Without more specific rules limiting the 
targeting of dual-use objects to individual networks or segments of 
networks, targeting the Internet as a whole could be plausible should 
the military advantage outweigh the civilian harm. However, the 
243. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 125.
244. Id. at 127.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. What the law ought to be (de lege ferenda), as opposed to what the law is (de lege
lata). BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
248. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 134.
249. Id. at 135–36.
250. Id. at 135.
251. For a discussion of packet switching, see supra Part II.
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principle of necessity may prove sufficient to appropriately limit 
CNAs to the minimum level reasonably calculated to provide a 
military advantage.252 Because the Internet is utilized for sensitive 
civilian purposes such as emergency response, disaster relief, and 
medical diagnosis and records, any damage or loss of life resulting 
from disabling the Internet would have to be considered in 
determining whether the cyber attack is proportional,253 which might 
preclude an “all or nothing” Internet-wide assault. 
3. Avoiding the Use of Inherently
Indiscriminate Cyber Attacks
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited by the LOAC.254 Such 
attacks are those not directed at a lawful military objective, cannot be 
directed at a lawful military objective, or employ a means that cannot 
be controlled such that the nature of the attack would affect military 
objectives and civilian objects alike.255 Attacks that are deemed 
indiscriminate constitute war crimes.256 
In the cyberspace context, the question arises whether cyber 
attacks, or at least a subset of them, are per se indiscriminate. Some 
types of malware (for example, viruses and worms) that are targeted 
at military systems might inadvertently spread from the military 
objective to civilian objects.257 The Stuxnet virus, for example, 
escaped Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility due to a programming error 
and spread across the open Internet,258 leading to infections in 
civilian Iran, Indonesia, and India.259 Although such collateral 
damage may be controlled or mitigated, it remains unclear how much 
damage would be justified in a cyber attack on a dual-use military 
252. See supra note 193 and accompanying text; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 136
(emphasizing that “particular attention must be paid to the requirement to conduct operations in a 
manner designed to minimize harm to the civilian population and civilian objects” and that “[a]n 
attack on the Internet itself . . . might equally run afoul of the principle of proportionality”). 
253. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 136.
254. Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 51.
255. Id.
256. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.
183/9, art. 8. 
257. MELZER, supra note 9, at 30.
258. Sanger, supra note 7.
259. W32.Stuxnet, SYMANTEC ENTERPRISE SECURITY RESPONSES, http://www.symantec.com
/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-071400-3123-99 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). 
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objective that serves a significant civilian function.260 Customary 
international law indicates that the higher precautions required when 
targeting a dual-use object may provide sufficient deterrence against 
employing a potentially indiscriminate CNA.261 But because cyber 
infrastructure is globally interconnected, a cyber attack that employs 
self-propagating means may unpredictably affect civilian objects 
regardless of the amount of precaution an attacker employs, 
suggesting that certain CNA techniques (for instance, viruses and 
worms) should be deemed inherently indiscriminate and thus 
prohibited.262 The notion conflates the nature of the CNA with the 
way information is transmitted ad hoc across the Internet. Though a 
CNA may be carefully crafted, the indeterminable route to a target 
may bring the CNA in contact with unknown, vulnerable machines 
and access points, making TCP/IP indiscriminate, not necessarily the 
CNA itself.263 Unfortunately, states may have to accept that a cyber 
attack’s legality is infused with more uncertainty than planned 
traditional attacks.264 Such was the conclusion of the Tallinn experts, 
who found the uncertainty to be an ordinary consequence not unlike 
that which applies to conventional weaponry deemed uncontrollable 
or insufficiently precise.265 
A related problem is determining the degree of harm to a 
civilian object sufficient to violate the principle of distinction.266 
Implicit in this inquiry is the question of whether data itself 
constitutes an object within the meaning of the LOAC,267 making 
increasingly strange the Tallinn experts’ declaration that data should 
not be considered a military objective. Any cyber operation, whether 
espionage, exploitation, attack, or defense, will involve at least 
temporarily deleting or changing data existent on the targeted 
system.268 In fact, because most cyber attacks use non-destructive 
260. See MELZER, supra note 9, at 30 (contemplating whether a belligerent would be justified
in “incapacitat[ing] a domain name server directing global internet traffic, or [destroying] a major 
intercontinental submarine cable, in order to prevent their use for hostile cyber operations if more 
than 90% of the data transmitted are of civilian nature”). 
261. See id.
262. Gervais, supra note 27, at 570.
263. Id. at 538 (“The weakness of this model is that the effects of cyber attacks may be
indiscriminate and uncontrolled once unleashed.”). 
264. Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 851.
265. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 145–46.
266. MELZER, supra note 9, at 31.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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means, such as DDoS attacks, data manipulation will likely be the 
major form of collateral damage observed.269 Excluding data from 
eligibility as a military objective seems nonsensical, considering its 
deletion or manipulation may prove an exceedingly effective military 
advantage.270 An additional inquiry is what degree of unavoidable 
civilian harm is sufficient to make a cyber attack disproportionate.271 
If the data manipulation is minimal, temporary, or otherwise 
unharmful, even a breach onto the open Internet resulting in 
widespread collateral damage could be deemed de minimis. Some 
data manipulation CNAs, such as DDoS attacks, represent hardly any 
risk at all of collateral damage or indiscriminate targeting because 
they are not self-propagating and are directed at a specific IP 
address.272 However, more harmful cyber attacks that result in great 
civilian harm, such as worms or viruses meant to disrupt critical 
systems like the electrical grid, may unlawfully violate the principle 
of proportionality, despite the object of attack being data instead of a 
building or physical structure.273 Thus, it seems plausible that data 
can and should be construed as a valid military objective limited by 
the same principles of distinction and proportionality applicable to 
traditional physical military objectives. 
B. Cyber Attacks as Potential Violations
of the Law of Neutrality 
During an international armed conflict, a neutral state is 
obligated to prevent its territory from being used by belligerents in 
the conflict.274 Likewise, the belligerents must respect a neutral 
269. See id.
270. The aim of cyber attacks is not always physical destruction of hardware, and thus the
threshold for violating civilian object immunity should also necessarily encompass non-physical 
harms. See id. (noting “data should be regarded as an object which may not be directly targeted 
unless it fulfills all defining elements of a military objective”). But see Schmitt, supra note 233, at 
96 (proposing the characterization of all data as objects “overbroad” and that “the determinative 
question is whether the consequences attendant to its destruction involve the requisite level of 
harm to protected physical objects or persons”). 
271. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 136.
272. See id. at 131–32. (“This method of cyber attack would violate Rule 50 because the
attacker treats the military computers as a single target and by doing so harms the civilian 
computers when it was not necessary to do so.”). 
273. Cf. Gervais, supra note 27, at 570 (noting that viruses and worms can “quickly spiral out
of control, infiltrating civilian systems and causing damage to property that far surpasses the 
intent of the cyber attacker,” and that “the relative inability of a cyber attack to discriminate raises 
questions of its lawfulness”). 
274. Hague Convention, supra note 19, art. 5.
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state’s territory as “inviolable”275 and refrain from prohibited 
conduct within its boundaries.276 This law of neutrality can be 
interpreted to include operations in cyberspace.277 A neutral state’s 
obligation to enforce its neutrality, then, is triggered by the nature of 
the transmission: as a weapon (impermissible) or as a 
communication (permissible).278 Data sent via the Internet can take 
either form, and the transmission’s true nature may not be discernible 
without inspection.279 Impliedly, a neutral state might be required to 
actively monitor, intercept, and filter all transmissions that enter its 
cyberinfrastructure.280 Longstanding CIL, however, does not require 
a neutral state to actively prevent belligerents’ use of “telegraph or 
telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it 
or to companies or private individuals.”281 Data transmissions cannot 
be geographically routed with any accuracy to avoid the use of a 
neutral state’s telecommunications infrastructure.282 
Neutral states are thus exempted from enforcing a prohibition 
against belligerents’ use of “telegraph or telephone cables or of 
wireless telegraphy.”283 In the end, the law of neutrality may require 
neutral states to prevent belligerents from conducting hostile cyber 
attacks from within their territory, but not from passing externally 
originating cyber attacks through its publicly accessible 
cyberinfrastructure.284 
The Tallinn Manual supports the interpretation that a neutral 
state does not have an obligation to prevent belligerent use of its 
cyberinfrastructure for communications.285 However, the Tallinn 
275. Id. art. 1.
276. Such prohibited conduct includes “mov[ing] troops, or convoys of either munitions of
war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power” and “(a) erect[ing] on the territory of a 
neutral Power a wireless telegraphy station or other apparatus for the purpose of communicating 
with belligerent forces on land or sea; (b) us[ing] any installation of this kind established by them 
before the war on the territory of a neutral Power for purely military purposes, and which has not 
been opened for the service of public messages.” Id. arts. 2–3. 
277. MELZER, supra note 9, at 20.
278. Id.
279. Id. (“From a technical point of view the accurate answer is that, depending on the precise
nature and design of the cyber operation in question, either option can be the case.”). 
280. Id.
281. Hague Convention, supra note 19, art. 8.
282. MELZER, supra note 9, at 20.
283. Id. at 5. Data packets are sent ad hoc, meaning routes are unpredictable and not
pre-determined. See BELLIA ET AL., supra note 53, at 18. 
284. MELZER, supra note 9, at 20.
285. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 252.
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experts disagreed about whether a state violated the Tallinn Manual 
by transmitting a cyber attack across neutral cyberinfrastructure, or 
whether a neutral state must prevent passage of a cyber attack across 
its cyberinfrastructure.286 The attributes of cyberspace make 
compliance with this rule unusually complex. Because CNAs and 
CNDs may utilize “zombie computers located in one country to harm 
networks in another country—without [the] knowledge of any 
individual, much less the government,” two challenges present 
themselves.287 First, a country may be unaware that its neutrality is 
threatened at all.288 Second, lawful responses to violations of the law 
of neutrality depend upon correctly identifying the country of 
origin.289 As a result, the impracticability of attribution in cyberspace 
may preclude complete neutrality analysis.290 
Cyber combatants using “zombie computers” or IP spoofing 
may be conducting cyber attacks from within a neutral state, but to 
the neutral state the origin of the cyber attacks may look external or 
the nature of the transmission may look communicative.291 Thus, the 
neutral state may be unaware that its obligation to maintain neutrality 
has been triggered, or it may be unable to identify which state it 
should direct preventative measures against once known.292 Further 
clarification is required, then, of attribution and the law of neutrality 
as they relate to cyber attacks to facilitate proper application of the 
LOAC. Such development might remove impediments to attribution 
and any subsequent LOAC analysis.293 
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE JUS AD BELLUM AND JUS IN BELLO
WHEN RESPONDING TO CYBER ATTACKS 
When a cyber attack cannot accurately be categorized as a use of 
force, attribution to a state is impossible, or violations of conducting 
hostilities are inconclusive, there are several alternate means by 
which a victim state may seek relief or respond. The most practical 
include: (1) prosecuting CNAs or CNDs as crimes under domestic 
286. Id. at 252–53.
287. Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 856.
288. Id.
289. Id.; see also supra Part III.
290. Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 856.
291. See id.
292. See id.
293. See id.
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law; (2) seeking reparations for violating the non-interference 
principle; and (3) improving domestic cybersecurity. The alternatives 
are discussed in order of individual efficacy and relative feasibility. 
A. Domestic Prosecution for Cybercrimes
A state may seek to treat cyber attacks as criminal acts, rather 
than violations of international law.294 If so, domestic law 
enforcement would be the appropriate means to address the attack, 
similar to prosecuting domestic criminals “committing fraud and 
stealing identities online.”295 In fact, most harmful cyber operations 
are acts of cyber crime, such as identity theft and espionage, and 
relatively few cyber attacks would truly implicate either the jus ad 
bellum or jus in bello.296 
The United States has several statutes that criminalize various 
cyber activities, including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 
1984297 and the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.298 These laws 
criminalize “fraud involving devices, computers, or email; malicious 
interference in communication lines, stations, or systems; electronic 
communication interception; illicit access to electronic 
communications and records; and recording of dialing, routing, 
addressing, and signaling information.”299 Despite their breadth, 
these domestic laws had been limited by their extraterritorial 
inapplicability.300 The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, though, 
broadened the ban against access device fraud and computer fraud to 
encompass perpetrators outside the jurisdiction of the United 
States.301 Expanding the U.S. domestic law that is currently outside 
the scope of the PATRIOT Act may enable full prosecution of any 
and all cyber attacks targeted against the United States or its 
citizens.302 Legislators could amend other statutes bearing on cyber 
attacks to expressly include extraterritorial reach, which, if 
294. Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 828–29.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 838.
297. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
298. Id. § 1831.
299. Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 874.
300. See id.
301. Id. at 874–75.
302. Id. at 877.
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reciprocated internationally, could increase enforcement and 
legitimacy.303 
Similarly, the 2001 Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime,304 to which the United States became a party in 2006, 
represents the first international effort to criminalize various 
computer activities.305 The Cybercrime Convention established a 
“common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against 
cybercrime.”306 The Cybercrime Convention includes offenses 
related to illegal access, data interference, and system interference of 
computer data and systems, and requires party states to adopt 
domestic legislative measures establishing criminal offenses and 
penalties for such acts.307 Parties to the Convention must also 
cooperate with each other in investigations and proceedings.308 Such 
cooperation may also limit parties’ ability to conduct cyber attacks 
that contravene the Convention’s intent.309 
As of January 2012, thirty countries are parties to the 
Cybercrime Convention, while sixteen others are merely 
signatories.310 According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, a party to a treaty consents to be bound by all provisions of 
the treaty, unless the party makes express reservations to specific 
provisions.311 On the other hand, signatories that have not yet ratified 
a treaty are not bound by the specific provisions of the treaty, but 
they are nevertheless bound not to violate the treaty’s general 
objective and purpose.312 Thus, a party state to the Cybercrime 
Convention may be deterred from launching a cyber attack against 
another party state, knowing that such conduct would trigger 
sanctions under the would-be victim state’s domestic laws.313 
Signatory states may also be deterred because a cyber attack against 
a party state would blatantly defeat the Cybercrime Convention’s 
303. Id.
304. Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, E.T.S. No. 185, Nov. 23, 2001 (entered
into force July 1, 2004) [hereinafter Cybercrime Convention]. 
305. Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 862–63.
306. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 304, pmbl.
307. Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 863.
308. Id. at 863–64.
309. Id. at 864.
310. Id. at 863 n.200.
311. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 17, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
312. Id. art. 18.
313. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 304, art. 13.
1008 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:969 
general purpose to protect society against cybercrime through 
internationally cooperative prosecution.314 Unfortunately, the 
deterrent effect on signatories may be rendered toothless by the fact 
that there are no clear repercussions for breach of the Convention’s 
general purpose.315 Despite such limitations, the Cybercrime 
Convention represents the most developed international cybercrime 
framework in existence.316 Further, it offers a starting point for 
developing a fully comprehensive international cybercrime regime 
capable of avoiding the pitfalls of attribution and use of force 
categorization that burden the jus ad bellum.317 
In contrast to the LOAC, a state may pursue the cybercrime 
route because a CNA may not rise to the level of a use of force or is 
traced to a private individual(s) whose conduct could not be 
attributed to a state.318 Indeed, treating cyber attacks as cybercrime 
may prove preferable or even necessary when the attacks are neither 
serious nor large enough to merit international attention.319 
Therefore, although current international laws may not be sufficient 
to effectively counter cyber-attacks, it is certainly possible to use 
current domestic criminal law to combat cyber attacks in the United 
States.320 Until the international uncertainty surrounding cyber 
attacks as acts of war is resolved, it makes sense for the criminal 
justice system, not the national defense, to adjudicate alleged 
violations.321 Furthermore, treating cyber attacks as domestic crimes 
may increase international cooperation, as is required under the 
Cybercrime Convention or other extradition laws.322 By contrast, 
under the LOAC, neutral states may be hesitant to assist victim states 
for fear of violating neutrality principles. Cybercrime prosecution is 
also advantageous because domestic laws can be implemented in a 
much quicker, more efficient, and effective manner than developing 
314. Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 864.
315. See id.
316. Id.
317. See id.
318. See Leaven & Dodge, supra note 11, at 17.
319. See id.
320. Id.
321. Joshua E. Kastenberg, Non-Intervention and Neutrality in Cyberspace: An Emerging
Principle in the National Practice of International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 43, 55 (2009). 
322. See, e.g., Cybercrime Convention, supra note 304.
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an international treaty323 and would be applicable to all perpetrators, 
not just the treaty parties. 
Consequently, prosecuting a CNA as a cybercrime circumvents 
the problem of attempting to categorize the attack as a use of force 
under the jus ad bellum, only to find the attack attributable to an 
individual and not a state.324 A victim state would avoid wasting 
effort and resources meticulously studying the CNA, gathering 
evidence to support state attribution, and preparing a lawful LOAC 
compliant response to the CNA.325 Instead, the effort and resources 
could be used to domestically prosecute the individual associated 
with the IP address responsible for originating the CNA—a much 
easier task than proving state responsibility through the demanding 
Nicaragua or Tadic tests.326 
The United States has advocated for increased focus on 
domestic countermeasures, while discouraging the development of a 
cyberwarfare international treaty.327 Treating cyber attacks as 
criminal acts recognizes domestic prosecution’s efficacy and begins 
to shift the paradigm away from warfare.328 If further domestic 
development occurs, such as extending extraterritorial reach to 
domestic statutes bearing on cybercrime or the Cybercrime 
Convention globally proliferating, “cyberwarfare” might eventually 
be confined to the jus in bello, where a CNA’s place as a military 
tool is more apparent and the legal issues are less significant and 
pervasive than in the jus ad bellum. 
B. Reparations for Violations of State Responsibility
and the Principle of Non-Intervention 
Despite a cyber attack potentially failing to rise to the level of a 
use of force, international law dictates that such an action may still 
be unlawful as a violation of state responsibility and the principle of 
non-intervention.329 While not explicit in the U.N. Charter, Article 
323. Leaven & Dodge, supra note 11, at 17.
324. See id.
325. Id. at 18.
326. See id.
327. Id. at 20.
328. See id. at 21.
329. Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 858; Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 842; see also
Russell Buchan, Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited Interventions?, 17 J. 
CONFLICT SECURITY LAW 211 (2012) (arguing that cyber attacks that are coercive in nature will 
violate non-intervention principles embedded in international law). 
1010 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:969 
2(1) impliedly invokes the concept, stating that “[t]he Organization is 
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members.”330 The principle has been affirmed by the ICJ in 
Nicaragua331 and is considered an established principle of CIL.332 
The prohibition against intervention “is a corollary of every 
state’s right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence.”333 Prohibited interference constitutes what the ICJ 
referred to in Nicaragua as “matters in which each State is permitted, 
by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is 
the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and 
the formulation of foreign policy.”334 Similar to the duty to respect a 
state’s neutrality and its territorial sovereignty, the principle of 
non-intervention should apply to cyberspace as well.335 Intentionally 
intruding into a state’s cyberspace and interfering with a state’s 
ability to maintain its sovereignty in the virtual realm could represent 
a violation of international law, whether it rises to the level of use of 
force or not.336 Establishing a violation of the non-intervention 
principle will thus require determining whether the cyber attack was 
intended to coerce a policy change upon matters the victim state is 
entitled to freely determine.337 To illustrate, the 2007 DDoS attacks 
on Estonia were inflicted upon both the private and public sectors, 
including websites run by the Prime Minister, his political party, the 
office of the President, Parliament, and the State Audit Office, for 
approximately three weeks.338 The attacks were partially motivated 
by the government’s decision to relocate a monument, a decision that 
“remains the free choice of any government.”339 Consequently, 
despite the DDoS attacks failing to rise to the level of a use of force 
330. U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 1.
331. Nicaragua, supra note 75, ¶ 205.
332. Buchan, supra note 329, at 211.
333. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 428 (Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, eds., 9th
ed. 1992). 
334. Nicaragua, supra note 75, ¶ 205.
335. See Buchan, supra note 329, at 211.
336. Id.; see also Kastenberg, supra note 321, at 56–57 (explaining that if a neutral state takes
no action in policing individual cyber-attacks, it loses its cyber-neutral status); Leaven & Dodge, 
supra note 11, at 22 (arguing that because “cyberwarfare may be properly categorized as subject 
to ‘legislative action’ under the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council may be able 
to act affirmatively”). 
337. Buchan, supra note 329, at 223, 226.
338. Id. at 225–26.
339. Id. at 218, 226.
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under U.N. Charter Article 2(4), they likely qualified as an unlawful 
intervention upon Estonia’s sovereignty.340 
Though enforcing such a violation may prove difficult in states 
that emphasize an almost unlimited right of free speech, such 
enforcement presents a mechanism by which those states whose 
sovereignty has been interfered with are entitled to reparations and 
non-military counter-measures.341 A non-interference approach 
removes one of the major prongs under the jus ad bellum: 
categorizing the cyber attack as a use of force or armed attack.342 
Assuming state attribution is possible, a victim state can avoid the 
frustration and consequences associated with incorrectly defining 
ambiguous cyber attacks, such as unlawfully resorting to forceful 
self-defense.343 Instead, CNAs might be treated as a basic breach of 
CIL, utilizing an existent, simple remedial scheme.344 A victim state 
that suffers immense disruption by another state’s CNA, but 
otherwise experiences no death, damage, or destruction, similar to 
Estonia in 2007, could have an immediately clear basis for seeking 
sanctions or reparations.345 
C. Greater Investment in Cybersecurity
Although the underlying physical structure of the Internet is 
expensive to develop as well as maintain, committing to keeping it 
secure may prove more valuable than the time, energy, and resources 
needed to pursue international relief from cyber attacks. The global 
cyberinfrastructure is necessarily located within numerous sovereign 
states that could, though a drastic measure, disconnect their entire 
populations from the Internet and prevent foreigners from accessing 
Internet resources operated from within those states.346 State 
sovereignty grants a state the right to control access to its territory, 
which impliedly includes Internet access within its boundaries.347 
Clearly, “pulling the plug” on the Internet would likely be a last 
340. Id. at 214–15.
341. See id. at 226.
342. See id. at 211–12, 227.
343. See id. at 227.
344. See generally Buchan, supra note 329, at 211 (noting that coercive attacks violate the
non-intervention principle). 
345. See id. at 226.
346. Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 844–45.
347. Id. at 845.
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resort against only the most calamitous of cyber attacks.348 In this 
case, a state may risk losing exportation and financial transaction 
capability, public goodwill, or fragmentation of the Internet along 
territorial boundaries.349 
Less inimical cybersecurity measures exist for a state to 
implement, which could lower cyber threat response time and 
mitigate a cyber attack’s damage. Rather than total disconnection, a 
state may opt to limit Internet access and actively monitor its content 
for potentially malicious threats.350 Nevertheless, in states where the 
Internet is perceived as a public good, such Orwellian surveillance 
may prove politically controversial and financially detrimental.351 Or 
perhaps in an effort to safeguard civilian cyberinfrastructure, state 
militaries could take major systems and networks offline and onto 
closed-circuit networks. 
The United States has commissioned cybersecurity outfits, such 
as the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), to protect 
sensitive infrastructures from harmful cyber attacks.352 Established 
June 23, 2009, USCYBERCOM seeks “to coordinate Pentagon 
efforts in the emerging battlefield of cyberspace and computer-
network security.”353 The mission statement of USCYBERCOM 
includes goals to “prepare to, and when directed, conduct full-
spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in 
all domains, ensure U.S./Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and 
deny the same to our adversaries.”354 However, Lieutenant General 
Keith Alexander, director of USCYBERCOM, maintains that “[t]his 
is not about efforts to militarize cyberspace, . . . [r]ather it’s about 
348. Id. at 846.
349. See id. China, as an example, has the ability to disconnect itself from the global Internet
and operate an internal domestic form of the Internet. Id. The United States has also debated 
developing an Internet “kill switch.” Id. (citing Declan McCullagh, Renewed Push to Give 
Obama an Internet “Kill Switch”, CBS NEWS (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news 
/renewed-push-to-give-obama-an-internet-kill-switch/). 
350. See Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 846–47. “[S]overeign states . . . have the power and legal
authority to establish laws and institutions within their territories to provide for national public 
goods—such as Internet access—as well as to take action to ensure the safety and welfare of the 
nation and its citizens.” Id. (citing JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE 
INTERNET: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD, 65–86 (2006)). 
351. See id. at 850.
352. Leaven & Dodge, supra note 11, at 1–2.
353. Id. at 2.
354. Id.
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safeguarding the integrity of our military system.”355 Whether 
genuine or not, the comments echo a more effective, practical 
approach to dealing with cyber attacks based upon protecting 
sensitive networks from CNA effects. Determining the character and 
extent of defense measures can be a precarious balancing act. 
Lieutenant General Alexander was also the director of the National 
Security Agency (NSA) from 2005 to 2014.356 The NSA came under 
intense public scrutiny for secret surveillance programs that collected 
records, metadata, and other information about telephone calls and 
electronic communications—including communications made by 
Americans—in the name of national security.357 Once knowledge 
leaked of the existence of the surveillance programs, as well as the 
secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court responsible for issuing 
the judicial warrants approving the surveillance,358 Lieutenant 
General Alexander and the NSA faced accusations of rampant 
unwarranted government spying.359 
Though the NSA surveillance represents an example of overly 
zealous cyberdefense, it contains lessons for modifying cyberdefense 
policies. In the future, government cyberdefense programs may 
prove more effective at balancing state security interests and public 
privacy interests if they are made transparent and narrowly tailored 
to specific cyber threats and network vulnerabilities, rather than 
secret, seemingly indiscriminate bulk surveillance.360 Crafting a 
more nuanced strategy that targets actual threats will improve overall 
efficacy and instill trust in the public that the government is not 
callously discarding notions of online privacy for the sake of 
strengthening national cybersecurity. 
Overall, shifting the focus away from categorizing cyber attacks 
as warfare may also incentivize innovation. This may lead to more 
355. Id.
356. David Sanger & Thom Shanker, N.S.A. Director Firmly Defends Surveillance Efforts,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/13/us/nsa-director-gives-firm-and 
-broad-defense-of-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0.
357. Id.
358. Todd Lindeman, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, WASH. POST., June 7,
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court/2013 
/06/07/4700b382-cfec-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_graphic.html (noting that an astonishing 99.97 
percent of surveillance warrant requests—more than 14,000 in total—have been granted in the 
court’s 23-year history). 
359. Sanger & Shanker, supra note 356.
360. See Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 876.
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effective means to mitigate DDoS attacks, viruses, worms, and other 
common CNAs.361 A possible strategy might be to abandon a 
top-down bureaucratic approach to security and move towards a 
defense system that requires civilian participation.362 Because 
the computers and networks that comprise the Internet are 
interconnected, network vulnerabilities are not confined to 
high-value targets.363 Any unsecure computer can become the source 
of a cyber attack, so cyberdefense should be as all-encompassing as 
possible.364 Adopting a cybersecurity strategy that integrates military 
and civil defense aspects would allow for more complete elimination 
of vulnerabilities.365 Multi-faceted cybersecurity and technological 
innovation would allow states to compete against cyber attackers on 
a technological front, rather than a warfront. States may accomplish 
this shift by “[a]ddressing technical vulnerabilities . . . alongside 
effective public-private partnerships and market-based incentives 
such as tax breaks for enhancing security.”366 Implementing baseline 
norms, requiring that hardware and software developers meet best 
practices, and incentivizing public-private partnerships to share 
information about cyber threats may diminish the effects of CNAs to 
the point where international remedy under the jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello is rendered unnecessary.367 
VII. CONCLUSION
The effort of the Tallinn Manual and other LOAC experts to 
dovetail the expanding use of cyber attacks into the war paradigm 
appears premature. The problems of attribution and categorizing 
cyber operations under the jus ad bellum, as well as the less 
pervasive issues of distinction, proportionality, and neutrality in the 
jus in bello, suggest the current manifestations of cyber attacks belie 
their inclusion as warfare. That is not to say that cyber attacks will 
not at some point be capable of being properly treated as warfare. 
361. See id. at 884 (noting the cultivation of research communities able to take on
next-generation cybersecurity challenges is essential). 
362. Susan W. Brenner, Cyber-Threats and the Limits of Bureaucratic Control, 14 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 137, 256–57 (2013). 
363. Id. at 256.
364. Id.
365. See Scott J. Shackelford, Towards Cyberpeace: Managing Cyber Attacks Through
Polycentric Governance, 62 AM. U.L. REV. 1273, 1364 (2013). 
366. Id. at 1355.
367. Id. at 1364.
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However, at this point in history, that reality just has not yet come to 
fruition. Cyber attacks as currently understood rarely have 
militaristic ends in mind, but rather take the form of espionage, 
crime, or political and economic coercion.368 
Perhaps “cyberwarfare,” then, is a misnomer, and alternative 
frameworks are better suited to deal with the rise in malicious cyber 
operations. Instead of utilizing a language of “warfare” 
and “attacks,” using terms such as “cyber-interference” or 
“cyber-intrusions” should be implemented to reduce the inclination 
to treat all CNAs as acts of war. The new terminology would conjure 
notions of cybersecurity, criminal prosecution, and international 
sovereignty, which are all better suited as remedial schemes than the 
jus ad bellum. 
The nature of computer and network interference suggests that 
alternative regimes are more appropriate to resolve cyber disputes 
with potent, comprehensive, and effective frameworks befitting the 
characteristics of cyberspace. Though the Tallinn Manual makes 
significant headway in integrating “cyberwarfare” into the jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello, categorization and attribution issues suggest 
excluding cyber operations from their purview.369 Domestic criminal 
prosecution, the principle of non-intervention, and expanded 
domestic cybersecurity provide faster and more reliable responses to 
cyber attacks than remedies under the international laws of war—
without requiring a victim state grasp at elusive categories or 
invisible targets. 
368. See, e.g., Hollis, supra note 4, at 1024 (noting the Estonia cyber attacks in 2007 were a
response to the Estonian government relocating a Soviet-era war monument). 
369. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 5; see supra Parts III, IV.
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